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Hiring a manager or not? When asymmetric equilibria arise under outsourcing to a rival是否雇用经理?什么时候会产生不对称平衡的外包给竞争对手
报告作者: Luciano Fanti ; Marcella Scrimitore
出 版 者: Luciano Fanti ;Marcella Scrimitore
出版时间: 2017-01-01
来源信息: Luciano Fanti ;Marcella Scrimitore.2017-01-01,共22页。
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This paper reconsiders the issue of the endogenous choice of delegation in a market in which a vertically integrated producer (VIP) sells an input to a downstream competitor. The choice of whether to hire a manager or not is made at a preplay stage of a game developed by assuming that, within managerial firms, owners provide their managers with incentives affecting both the VIP's decision r ........
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关 键 词: outsourcing; 医药外包; IT; 信息技术; ITO; 信息技术服务外包
自动关键词: outsourcing; 医药外包; 外包; 人员招聘; 外包模式
所属领域: 信息技术服务外包
服务外包综合
入库时间: 2019-10-14
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